

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

NICKIE KANE,

Plaintiff,

-against-

CITY OF NEW YORK; NEW YORK POLICE  
DEPARTMENT; SARGENT PUMELLA;  
OFFICER JOHN DOE; OFFICER JANE DOE,

Defendants.

22-CV-1711 (LTS)

TRANSFER ORDER

LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge:

Plaintiff Nickie Kane, who resides in South Richmond Hill (Queens County), New York brings this action *pro se*. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated her rights in Queens County, New York. For the following reasons, the Court transfers this action to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York.

**DISCUSSION**

Under the general venue provision, a federal civil action may be brought in:

(1) a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the State in which the district is located; (2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred . . . ; or (3) if there is no district in which an action may otherwise be brought as provided in this section, any judicial district in which any defendant is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction with respect to such action.

28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). For venue purposes, a “natural person” resides in the district where the person is domiciled, and a defendant corporation generally resides “in any judicial district in which such defendant is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction with respect to the civil action in question . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(1), (2). Where a state has more than one judicial district, a defendant corporation generally “shall be deemed to reside in any district in that State within

which its contacts would be sufficient to subject it to personal jurisdiction if that district were a separate State.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(d).<sup>1</sup>

Plaintiff sues: (1) the City of New York; (2) the New York City Police Department, which is an agency of the City of New York; and (3) Sergeant Pumella, (4) Officer John Doe, and (5) Officer Jane Doe, who presumably work in a precinct in Queens, New York. Plaintiff alleges that the events that are the basis of her claims occurred in Richmond Hill, New York, in Queens County, which is located in the Eastern District of New York. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 112(c). Because Plaintiff alleges that the events giving rise to her claims occurred in Queens County, venue is proper in the Eastern District of New York. *See* § 1391(b)(2). The City of New York and the New York City Police Department reside in this judicial district as well as in the Eastern District of New York. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 112(b), (c). Thus, while this Court may be an appropriate venue for this action under Section 1391(b)(1), it is clear that the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York is a proper venue for this action under Section 1391(b)(1) and Section 1391(b)(2).

Even though this Court may be an appropriate court to hear these claims, the Court may transfer claims “[f]or the convenience of the parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice.” 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). “District courts have broad discretion in making determinations of convenience under Section 1404(a) and notions of convenience and fairness are considered on a case-by-case basis.” *D.H. Blair & Co. v. Gottdiener*, 462 F.3d 95, 106 (2d Cir. 2006). Moreover, courts may transfer cases on their own initiative. *See Cento v. Pearl Arts & Craft Supply Inc.*,

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<sup>1</sup> In a state with multiple districts, if there is no such district, “the corporation shall be deemed to reside in the district within which it has the most significant contacts.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(d).

No. 03-CV-2424 (LAK), 2003 WL 1960595, at \*1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 24, 2003) (“Courts have an independent institutional concern to see to it that the burdens of litigation that is unrelated to the forum that a party chooses are not imposed unreasonably on jurors and judges who have enough to do in determining cases that are appropriately before them. The power of district courts to transfer cases under Section 1404(a) *sua sponte* therefore is well established.”); *see also Lead Indus. Ass’n. Inc. v. OSHA*, 610 F.2d 70, 79 n.17 (2d Cir. 1979) (noting that the “broad language of 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) would seem to permit a court to order transfer *sua sponte*”).

In determining whether transfer is appropriate, courts consider the following factors: (1) the convenience of witnesses; (2) the convenience of the parties; (3) the locus of operative facts; (4) the availability of process to compel the attendance of the unwilling witnesses; (5) the location of relevant documents and the relative ease of access to sources of proof; (6) the relative means of the parties; (7) the forum’s familiarity with the governing law; (8) the weight accorded to the plaintiff’s choice of forum; (9) trial efficiency; and (10) the interest of justice, based on the totality of circumstances. *Keitt v. N.Y. City*, 882 F. Supp. 2d 412, 458-59 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); *see also N.Y. Marine and Gen. Ins. Co. v. LaFarge No. Am., Inc.*, 599 F.3d 102, 112 (2d Cir. 2010) (setting forth similar factors). A plaintiff’s choice of forum is accorded less deference where plaintiff does not reside in the chosen forum and the operative events did not occur there. *See Iragorri v. United Tech. Corp.*, 274 F.3d 65, 72 (2d Cir. 2001).

Under Section 1404(a), transfer appears to be appropriate in this case. The alleged underlying events occurred in Queens County, in the Eastern District of New York. In addition, it is likely that relevant documents and witnesses are located in that judicial district. Based on the totality of the circumstances, the Court concludes that it is in the interest of justice to transfer this action to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York. *See* § 1404(a).

### CONCLUSION

The Clerk of Court is directed to transfer this action to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York. Whether Plaintiff should be permitted to proceed further without prepayment of fees is a determination to be made by the transferee court. A summons shall not issue from this Court. This order closes this case.

The Court certifies, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith, and therefore *in forma pauperis* status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. *See Coppedge v. United States*, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962).

The Clerk of Court is directed to mail a copy of this order to Plaintiff and note service on the docket.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 4, 2022  
New York, New York

/s/ Laura Taylor Swain  
LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN  
Chief United States District Judge